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NOT DEAD YET: THE ENDURING MIRANDA RULE 25 YEARS 
AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S OCTOBER TERM 1984 
WILLIAM F. JUNG* 
The holding and rule ordained by Miranda v. Arizona,1 is now in its fifth 
decade.  Although often maligned and occasionally lauded, the Miranda rule 
has remained an integral part of criminal procedure and Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence in this country.  This article examines Miranda and the rather 
rocky road it has traveled, especially in overcoming two cases impacting the 
rule in the Supreme Court’s October Term 1984: New York v. Quarles and 
Oregon v. Elstad.  A recent thesis of Professor Yale Kamisar is that Miranda, 
after surviving these cases and others, was dealt a body-blow by a case from 
the later Rehnquist Court.  This theory may be overstated and is critiqued 
below. The article concludes by suggesting improvements to Fifth Amendment 
interrogation procedures, both within and independent of Miranda. 
I.  THE MIRANDA OPINION 
Forty-three years after its creation, the majority opinion in Miranda still 
reads like a powerful and wide-reaching ukase.  The Court intended to write 
and invoke a firm and clear rule of criminal procedure for every police officer 
in the country, and to impose this rule immediately.  Miranda’s very firm tone 
and clear direction still resonates.  Its boldness remains remarkable.  The Court 
simply decided to use the Constitution to write rules of criminal procedure.  
Legislatures, study commissions, and bar rule-writing committees would not 
be needed to create this rule and standard for police interrogation. 
The opinion was written, of course, as a follow-up to the Escobedo v. 
Illinois2 case from two terms prior.  That case found a Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel during custodial interrogation and reversed a conviction where the 
police ignored the confessing suspect’s requests for counsel.3 
 
* J.D. 1983, University of Illinois College of Law; B.A. 1980, Vanderbilt University.  The author 
is a board-certified criminal trial lawyer in Tampa, Florida.  The author served as a law clerk to 
the Hon. William H. Rehnquist in the Supreme Court’s October Term 1984. 
 1. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
 3. Id. at 490–91. 
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Although Miranda relocated the right to counsel during interrogation to the 
Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause, Escobedo and Miranda can best 
be viewed as the Supreme Court deciding that the “third degree,” the use of 
inherently coercive interrogation techniques, was simply going to stop in this 
country.4  Miranda, at its most basic, simply aimed to stop any such practices 
cold.  The goal of the rule is indeed laudatory.  The sound purpose, and likely 
necessity, of the rule may make the aggressive force of its creation and birth 
understandable.5  The opinion’s text begins with an extensive history lesson 
concerning the origins of the self-incrimination right.6  The Court reviewed the 
struggles in English common law to establish this right.7 The firm 
establishment of the right to avoid self-incrimination, enshrined in the Fifth 
Amendment, was then juxtaposed against modern police interrogation 
techniques designed to overcome that right without physical force.8  As the 
Court noted with a touch of dismay, “[t]he entire thrust of police interrogation 
there, as in all the cases today, was to put the defendant in such an emotional 
state as to impair his capacity for rational judgment.”9 
Although rich with historical and factual detail, the opinion’s holding was 
simple and clear: custodial interrogation requires a four part warning. The 
subject must be informed clearly that he has a right to remain silent, that 
anything he says can be used against him in court, that he has a right to an 
attorney’s presence during questioning, and if he can not afford an attorney, 
one will be appointed for him.10  The opinion also makes clear that waiver of 
these rights can only be established by the state by overcoming a high or 
“heavy” burden.11 
Like only a few other bold Supreme Court opinions establishing new 
constitutional or procedural rights, Miranda was not incremental: it was a large 
and controversial jump.  Its firm rule was easy to state but left much to be 
settled later.  For example, the opinion remains uncertain as to whether the rule 
was constitutional, straight out of the Fifth Amendment, or whether it was a 
prophylactic, advisory rule.  Passages in the opinion can be read both ways, 
leaving that issue and others for a later day. 
 
 4. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440–45. 
 5. Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).  Dissents that do not eventually prevail have little 
persuasive force or impact on the law, of course.  However, Justice White’s lengthy dissent was 
hard hitting: “[T]he Court’s holding today is neither compelled nor even strongly suggested by 
the language of the Fifth Amendment, is at odds with American and English legal history, and 
involves a departure from a long line of precedent. . . .”  Id. 
 6. Id. at 442. 
 7. Id. at 442–43. 
 8. See id. at 444. 
 9. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465. 
 10. Id. at 474. 
 11. Id. at 475. 
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Likewise, the remedy for a confession taken in violation of the rule was 
unstated.  Was the confession suppressed for all purposes?  Could it be used to 
impeach at least?  Was the confession like a Fourth Amendment violation, a 
“poisonous tree” whose “fruit” or derivative use and leads were also 
suppressible?  These and many other unanswered questions would be answered 
over the next forty years. 
II.  MIRANDA IN THE SUPREME COURT’S OCTOBER TERM 1984 
A. The Precursor: Michigan v. Tucker 
Prior to the key cases in October Term 1984, the Supreme Court had 
issued Michigan v. Tucker,12 with Justice Rehnquist writing the majority 
opinion.  In Tucker, the defendant identified a key eyewitness through a 
statement that came after faulty Miranda warnings.13  The warnings omitted 
that the defendant had a right to free counsel if he were indigent.14  The 
warnings were otherwise fairly given, and the facts of the case suggest that the 
suspect’s right to counsel was respected, and he was not otherwise coerced or 
given the “third degree.”15 
Although the actual statement given by the defendant was suppressed as a 
Miranda violation, the trial court did admit the eyewitness testimony.16  On 
appeal then, the issue was whether a Miranda violation could be a “poisonous 
tree” such that any fruit or evidence derived from the violation should be 
suppressed.17 
The Court found that only a violation of Miranda’s “prophylactic 
standards” occurred, not a violation of the underlying constitutional right.18  
The Miranda violation was not intentional by the police, nor even negligent 
since the conduct occurred before the actual Miranda rule was announced, but 
prior to trial.19  The Court found significant that the violation was 
unintentional, as the rule had not yet been announced.20  Therefore, the bar on 
using the derivative fruits of the illegal confession, as suggested by the Wong 
Sun21 line of cases, did not apply. 
 
 12. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
 13. Id. at 436. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 444–45. 
 16. Id. at 437. 
 17. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445. 
 18. See id. at 439. 
 19. Id. at 437. 
 20. Id. at 447. 
 21. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
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B. Quarles: “Where’s the Gun?” 
During the 1984 Term, New York v. Quarles22 was known to Court 
watchers as the “Where’s the gun?” case.  The case established a “public 
safety” exception to Miranda.23  The Court held that Miranda’s “prophylactic 
rule” protecting the Fifth Amendment was outweighed in situations posing a 
threat to public safety.24 
In Quarles, a woman told police officers that she had been raped at 
gunpoint, consequently the officers chased the assailant into a supermarket.25  
Inside the market, the officers stopped and frisked the assailant.26  When the 
officer saw the assailant with an empty holster, he asked, “Where’s the gun?”  
The defendant answered, “Over there.”27  The trial court admitted the un-
Mirandized statement of the defendant and the gun.28 
The Quarles exception is fairly unremarkable.  When the exigency passes, 
so does the exception.  Although the rule makes sense and is not controversial, 
Professor Kamisar rightly noted that the Tucker and Quarles opinions drove a 
wedge between the Miranda warnings and the privilege against self-
incrimination.29 
C. Oregon v. Elstad: “The Cat out of the Bag” 
The other key opinion from October Term 1984 was Oregon v. Elstad.30  
In this “cat out of the bag” case, the interrogation was sequential, with the first 
post-arrest interrogation being unwarned, albeit voluntary.31  Moreover, there 
was no evidence of police chicanery or any attempt to deliberately thwart the 
warning requirement.32  At the station house sixty minutes later, the defendant 
confessed a second time in writing; this time after proper warnings.33 
The Court declined to hold the second, properly Mirandized confession 
inadmissible.34  The Court reversed the lower court’s holding that the second 
 
 22. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
 23. Id. at 651. 
 24. Id. at 654–56. 
 25. Id. at 651–52. 
 26. Id. at 652. 
 27. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 652. 
 28. Id. at 651. 
 29. Yale Kamisar, Dickerson v. United States: The Case That Disappointed Miranda’s 
Critics—And Then Its Supporters 45 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series, Paper No. 06-18, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=729163. 
 30. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
 31. Id. at 301. 
 32. See id. at 308. 
 33. Id. at 314–15. 
 34. Id. at 318. 
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confession was suppressible under Wong Sun,35 as a “poisonous fruit” of the 
first, illegal interrogation.36  The Court also declined to find that the second 
confession was rendered involuntary once the cat was out of the bag.37 
Justice O’Connor made clear for the Court that Miranda was not a 
“constitutional right” quoting and relying on the “prophylactic” language of 
Michigan v. Tucker.38  Because there was no constitutional violation, nor a 
compelled or involuntary confession, she argued, there was no fruit of the 
poisonous tree to suppress.39 
Of the two opinions from October Term 1984, Elstad was much more 
damaging to the notion of Miranda as constitutional writ.  Elstad left open a 
real chance for police misuse of the rule by deliberately omitting the Miranda 
warnings on the initial interrogation.  This police strategy was a concern of the 
Elstad dissenters,40 and is experienced by criminal practitioners in the field.  
This deliberate circumvention of the Miranda right would be addressed by the 
Court in a later case.41 
Elstad left Miranda as a non-constitutional doctrine.  Thus it is not 
surprising that there was more than a little head scratching when Dickerson 
later seemed to breathe the Fifth Amendment back into Miranda. 
III.  DICKERSON AND PATANE: PROFESSOR KAMISAR’S PARADOX 
Professor Yale Kamisar’s work was cited several times by the Miranda 
majority, and his scholarship is rightly viewed as a vital part of Miranda itself 
and indeed, part of modern American Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.42  Still 
adding to this body of scholarship after five decades, Professor Kamisar wrote 
a recent comment on point for the American Bar Association Journal.43  In this 
article, Kamisar traced the various cases after Miranda and addressed Justice 
Rehnquist’s hostility for the rule and his attempts to undermine it.44 
Kamisar’s article describes a paradox.  The thesis of Kamisar’s article 
states that Chief Justice Rehnquist inexplicably saved Miranda in Dickerson v. 
 
 35. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
 36. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 302–03, 318. 
 37. Id. at 318. 
 38. Id. at 306–08. 
 39. See id. at 305–08. 
 40. Id. at 328–30. 
 41. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2003). 
 42. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440 n.2, 470 n.38, 473 n.41, 511 (1966). 
 43. Yale Kamisar, Miranda’s Reprieve: How Rehnquist Spared the Landmark Confession 
Case, but Weakened Its Impact [hereinafter Miranda’s Reprieve], 92 A.B.A. J. 48 (June 2006). 
See also Yale Kamisar, Postscript: Another Look at Patane and Seibert, the 2004 Miranda 
“Poisoned Fruit” Cases [hereinafter Postscript], 2 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L. 97 (2004); Yale Kamisar, 
Foreword: From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to . . ., 99 MICH. L. REV. 879 (2001). 
 44. Miranda’s Reprieve, supra note 43, at 50–51. 
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United States45 by holding that it was a constitutional rule that could not be 
altered by statute, but then Miranda took a “bullet to the body” by the 
Rehnquist Court’s opinion in United States v. Patane, which holds that there is 
no bar to use of leads or fruits derived from a Miranda violation.46 
Kamisar’s article was written in an engaging, entertaining style appropriate 
to the magazine he was writing for.  He first outlined Rehnquist’s firm hostility 
to the Miranda rule.47  There is little doubt that William Rehnquist arrived in 
Washington in 1969 with a firm view that the Warren Court’s jurisprudence in 
criminal procedure areas was unwise and too expansive.48  In that regard, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist was far from alone. Kamisar discusses a previously 
unreleased memorandum that Rehnquist wrote to John Dean, a Justice 
Department superior when Rehnquist headed the Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel.49  In it, Rehnquist outlined a plan for a national commission to 
consider a constitutional amendment to reverse some Warren Court opinions in 
the criminal procedure field.  Miranda was one of the main targets.50  The 
commission idea was not accepted by Attorney General John Mitchell.  
According to Kamisar, Mitchell worried about controlling such a body.51 
It appears likely that Rehnquist carried these views with him to the 
Supreme Court and kept them throughout his tenure there.  Like others before 
him (Justices Warren and Brennan for example), however, Justice Rehnquist 
knew what it meant to get and garner votes.  A strongly held and principled 
view is admirable but powerless alone.  Although nicknamed “The Lone 
Ranger,” Justice Rehnquist was anything but.52  He was an amiable builder of 
bridges among his Supreme Court colleagues.53  Like Justice Brennan, he was 
a genuinely friendly, nice man.  These skills, along with a crackling intellect, 
made him a highly effective molder of the Court and its direction.54 
Both as a law clerk in the late 1940s, and later as an Associate Justice, 
Rehnquist served with the true “Lone Ranger” of modern times, William O. 
Douglas.55  Douglas’ firm principles and strong stands often caused him to 
stand alone.56  Douglas did not control or move the Court.57 
 
 45. See generally Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 46. Miranda’s Reprieve, supra note 43, at 51. 
 47. Id. at 48–50. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 50. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Miranda’s Reprieve, supra note 43, at 50. 
 52. See generally DAVID HUDSON JR., THE REHNQUIST COURT: UNDERSTANDING ITS 
IMPACT AND LEGACY (2007). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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Rehnquist was no Douglas of the Right.  It is Rehnquist’s personable and 
persistent massage of the judicial body—firm, constant, undramatic, and ever 
steady to the Right—that explains his jurisprudence regarding Miranda and 
solves Kamisar’s paradox. 
The first part of the paradox is Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in 
Dickerson.58  In that case, the Fourth Circuit ruled that a confession without 
Miranda warnings was admissible under 18 U.S.C. 3501.59  Section 3501 was 
a statute written two years after Miranda in which Congress sought to overturn 
that opinion.60  Section 3501 stated that a voluntary confession could be 
admissible in federal court, notwithstanding whether warnings were given.61  
Kamisar points out that Section 3501 was touted and endorsed by the Mitchell 
Justice Department when Rehnquist worked there in 1969.62  A memo 
advocating enforcement of Section 3501 against Miranda, likely drafted by 
Rehnquist, was sent by Mitchell to all U.S. Attorneys.63  Yet in 2000, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist authored an opinion for the Court striking Section 3501 as 
unconstitutional and affirming that the Miranda rule is constitutionally based.64  
Logic might tell the uninitiated observer that Chief Justice Rehnquist rightly 
should have been in the Dickerson dissent with Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
Professor Kamisar provides several possible explanations why a foe of 
Miranda would author the opinion upholding it firmly in Dickerson.  Although 
the short answer is that no one can be sure there seems little chance that Chief 
Justice Rehnquist had developed an affinity or liking for Miranda after all 
these years.  The theory posited by Kamisar that seems most likely is that 
Rehnquist authored the majority opinion to keep its writing out of the hands of 
the next senior-most Justice, John Paul Stevens.65 
Choosing the author of an opinion is a powerful tool in the hands of a 
Chief Justice, and it is one the Chief retains so long as the Chief is on the 
majority side of an opinion.  This powerful tactic can be wielded in various 
ways. 
 
 57. HUDSON, supra note 52. 
 58. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 59. Id. at 432.  In Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (Apr. 6, 2009), a sharply divided 
Court cut back on Section 3501 further.  The Court suppressed a voluntary confession given after 
the 6-hour presentment window of FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) and McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 
332 (1943) and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).  The opinion stated flatly that 
Section 3501(a) was intended to overrule Miranda, an attempt which the Court thwarted in 
Dickerson.  Corley, 129 S. Ct. at 1563 n.1.   
 60. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431–32. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Miranda’s Reprieve, supra note 43, at 50. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 51. 
 65. Id. 
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For example, this power can be used to limit or restrain the opinion as was 
likely done by Rehnquist keeping the case from Justice Stevens in Dickerson.  
The Chief Justice might also use the assignment power also to keep a wavering 
or unsure justice on the Chief’s side by assigning that wavering justice the 
discretion of crafting the metes and bounds of the ruling; and also creating in 
him the pride of authorship.  The opinion-assigning power can be used to 
disfavor or “punish” a member of the Court whom the Chief Justice views 
unfavorably.  Some Court observers believe Chief Justice Burger used the 
power this way concerning Justice Blackmun during the “Minnesota Twins’” 
later years.66  Conversely, the Chief can use the assignment power to reward 
allies or foster alliances.67 
The opinion-assigning power can also be used to direct a “hot potato” a 
certain way.  For example, the authors of The Brethren posited that Justice 
Blackmun sought to spare William Brennan, a prominent Roman Catholic, the 
“heat” of writing the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade.68 
Among the various reasons suggested by Kamisar for Rehnquist’s 
Miranda-affirming decision in Dickerson, the opinion assignment strategy 
seems most plausible.  Most likely, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote Dickerson to 
spare Miranda from being expanded by Justice Stevens.  To quote Professor 
Donald Dripps, the Dickerson opinion was “intentionally written to say less 
rather than more.”69 
Despite Rehnquist’s authorship of Dickerson, the enmity toward Miranda 
did not abate and was later seen in United States v. Patane.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, in the 5-4 Patane majority, assigned the opinion to Justice 
Thomas.70  Kamisar states that “Dickerson spared Miranda, the death penalty.  
But four years later, when Patane was decided, Miranda took a bullet to the 
body.”71  This is perhaps overstated, but Patane did once again chip away at 
the resilient rule. 
 
 66. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME 
COURT 121–22 (1979). 
 67. See id. at 170–72. 
 68. Id. at 172–73. 
 69. Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, 
and the Continuing Quest for Broad-But-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 3 (2001). 
 70. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004).  Justice Thomas’ opinion was a plurality 
judgment, only garnering three votes. Justices Kennedy and O’Connor concurred in the judgment.  
Id.  In a companion case to Patane, the Court encountered a deliberate attempt to evade Miranda 
by utilizing the loophole opened by Elstad: the police as a matter of deliberate strategy 
interrogated first without warnings, thereafter warned the subject and got a post-warning 
confession that was sought to be introduced.  See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2003).  
Kennedy joined the pro-Miranda majority in that companion case, and the confession was 
suppressed.  Id. at 604. 
 71. Miranda’s Reprieve, supra note 43, at 51. 
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In Patane, the Court addressed whether admission of a gun obtained as a 
fruit of a Miranda-violative confession was admissible.  Thomas’ plurality cut 
back on the impact of Dickerson and ruled that “the Miranda rule is a 
prophylactic employed to protect against violating the Self-Incrimination 
Clause.  The Self-Incrimination Clause, however, is not implicated by the 
admission into evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement.”72  In 
short, “[t]he Clause cannot be violated by introduction of nontestimonial 
evidence obtained as a result of voluntary statements.”73 
Patane did limit Miranda and cut back on the direction set by Dickerson, 
but a “bullet to the body” seems overstated.  The goal of Miranda was to help 
end “third degree” or “star chamber” tactics.  Miranda still does that after 
Patane, albeit with less stringency than preferred by Professor Kamisar.  
Moreover, an involuntary or compelled confession still possesses and has 
always possessed “fruit of the poisonous tree” derivative use protection.74 
Additionally, the Patane opinion itself had but three votes: Rehnquist, 
Scalia and Thomas.75  Justice O’Connor, in the concurrence, was replaced by 
Justice Alito, so perhaps that opinion might garner four at this time.  Patane’s 
companion case shows five votes to suppress intentional tactics employed to 
defeat the Miranda rights.76  A three-vote plurality should not be viewed as the 
death knell of a very resilient rule now approaching the half-century mark. 
Patane certainly was not unexpected.  Indeed, the Court had divided 
evenly on the issue in earlier cases.77  Elstad predated and predicted Patane.78  
Elstad, for example, stated that “[t]he Fifth Amendment, of course, is not 
concerned with nontestimonial evidence.”79 
The Court’s “impeachment” cases also foreshadow and support Patane.  In 
these cases, decided 35 years ago, confessions taken in violation of Miranda 
warnings and in violation of Miranda-invoked requests for counsel were held 
admissible to impeach.80  Certainly if Miranda violations did not bar use of 
self-incriminating statements, it appears unlikely Miranda would bar 
 
 72. Patane, 542 U.S. at 636. 
 73. Id. at 637. 
 74. Id. at 639–40. 
 75. Id. at 633. 
 76. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 603–04 (2003). 
 77. Massachusetts v. White, 439 U.S. 280 (1978) (per curiam).  See also Patterson v. United 
States, 485 U.S. 922 (1989) (White, J., dissenting). 
 78. Professor Kamisar observed: “[I]n Elstad the notion that Miranda was not a 
constitutional decision and therefore a violation of the Miranda rule was not deserving of a 
‘fruits’ doctrine.”  Postscript, supra note 44, at 114.  As Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence 
in the Patane judgment: “In Elstad, Quarles, and Harris v. New York, evidence obtained 
following an unwarned interrogation was held admissible.” Patane, 542 U.S. at 644 (citations 
omitted). 
 79. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985). 
 80. Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 
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admission of a non-testimonial gun.  Likewise, after Elstad, most lower courts 
were admitting non-testimonial fruits of Miranda violations.81 
Patane is also less of a blow to Miranda for a reason related to criminal 
evidence and trials.  Although leads or evidence (i.e. “the fruits”) obtained 
derivatively from a Miranda violation now may be used post-Patane, the 
confession itself cannot.82  That Miranda does not yield the “fruit of the 
poisonous tree” protection is less severe than in a search and seizure context. 
First, most interrogations are used as simple admissions at trial.  Most of 
them are not used derivatively to derive fruits.  They are most frequently used 
simply as post-arrest statements at trial.  Despite Patane, statements continue 
to be barred unless Miranda is followed. 
In the search and seizure Fourth Amendment context, the “tree” is the 
constitutional violation itself, usually an illegal entry or overbroad search.  The 
“tree” is rarely evidence and rarely used in Court.  Only the “fruit” is damaging 
in court, the items found without or beyond the warrant, those things in the 
house, or buried in the back yard, etc.  Accordingly, suppressing only the 
constitutional violation itself (the “tree” or illegal entry, overbroad physical 
search, etc.) means little and provides little protection.  The “fruits” (items 
found) are what is important at trial and if garnered illegally, they must be 
suppressed both to incent the police in the future and to prevent them from 
profiting in the present.  The Wong Sun “fruit of the poisonous tree” rule is 
more vital and needed in the Fourth Amendment context than the Fifth.83 
IV.  IMPROVING FIFTH AMENDMENT INTERROGATION PROCEDURES 
A. Within Miranda 
Any improvements in the area of interrogation procedures should be 
directed to making the law and rules clearer and making police compliance 
with those procedures simple and transparent.  Any change on improvement in 
these rules would focus on Miranda’s and the Self-Incrimination Clause’s 
underlying goal: protecting the rights of suspects to both non-coercive and 
constitutionally-informed interrogation.  Unfortunately, Miranda is now 
 
 81. David A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 805, 835–36 n.154. 
 82. See Patane, 542 U.S. at 630. 
 83. This somewhat esoteric concept appears to be what the Court was stating in Dickerson 
when it said: “[U]nreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned 
interrogation under the Fifth Amendment.”  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 
(2000).  Likewise in Elstad, the Court stated, “The exclusionary rule . . . when utilized to 
effectuate the Fourth Amendment, serves interests and policies that are distinct from those it 
serves under the Fifth.”  Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306. 
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freighted with layers of exceptions, loopholes, and by-ways created by case 
law. 
Within the context of Miranda, the most acute need for improvement 
nationwide is development of uniform warnings.  The varying nature of the 
Miranda warnings, many different to a startling degree, is remarkable.  A 
recent article has illustrated that among and even within jurisdictions, large 
differences exist in the nature of the warnings, their words, their length, their 
cognitive complexity and indeed their very subject matter.84  State courts 
routinely are asked to “pass” on, or adjudicate, the varying iterations of 
warnings that are given.85  It would be an easy task for law enforcement 
agencies nationwide, or a series of state supreme courts, to come together to set 
forth a uniform and simple four-part warning. 
The energy and expense expended in fighting and adjudicating these 
various iterations of Miranda texts and warnings is entirely unnecessary.  
Moreover, unclear or illegal warnings defeat the law enforcement goal of 
achieving legally effective interrogation and convicting the guilty.  The entire 
matter seems easily curable and remarkably wasteful. 
B. Outside Miranda 
One simple way to gain confidence in interrogation techniques and results, 
outside the context of Miranda, is to impose a recordation requirement.  Such a 
rule would require that all interrogations be recorded, perhaps with some 
safeguard for exigent reasons if a recording could not be made.  In this age of 
micro-electronics, the requirement would seem to pose only a mild 
inconvenience and would vastly increase confidence in the interrogation result.  
Indeed, most police officers carry cellular telephones with recording devices.  
To avoid a chill to interrogation, there could be no requirement that the suspect 
be warned about the taping or that the taping be visible.  Some jurisdictions do 
have this rule or variants of it.  All told, some 450 police departments record 
interrogations in varying factual situations.86 
Alaska and Minnesota require custodial interrogations to be recorded when 
practicable, under the due process clauses of their state constitutions.87  Texas 
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(Summer 2008). 
 85. For example, the Florida Supreme Court recently issued a 14-page opinion grappling 
with a printed law enforcement form warning that ultimately failed to advise the suspect of the 
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requires non-written confessions to be audio-recorded.88  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has appointed a study commission on the issue.89 
In 2003, Illinois passed legislation requiring that all police interrogations 
of suspects in homicide cases be recorded.90  The bill was sponsored by then-
State Senator Barack Obama.91 
Federal law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI, strongly resist such 
requirements and indeed have formal policies against recordation of 
interrogation.92  The reasons for these policies are not stated.  One reason, 
which seems less worthy given the ubiquitous nature of recording devices, is 
the inability to record.  This concern is easily handled by requiring recordation 
only when practical, such as at the station house or when some recording 
device may be present. 
Perhaps one reason cited for some law enforcement resistance to 
recordation of interrogation involves the use of deception or craft by the 
interrogator.  Deceptive interrogation techniques, such as false statements to 
the subject, are indeed permissible in some situations.93  Recordation of an 
interrogation that used deception or craft as at technique might later embarrass 
the officer, or might reveal confidential police practices.  A full discussion of 
how recordation requirements might intersect with deceptive-style 
interrogation is beyond the scope of this article and needs to be developed in 
practice.  There seems to be few cogent arguments against “sunlight,” 
however, and inertia appears to be the main reason for the objection. 
Recording interrogations as a routine practice would greatly enhance 
judicial and public confidence in the process, making for more solid and less 
suppressible confessions.  It would also likely increase the high percentage of 
guilty pleas, as is already the case where there are written confessions. 
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